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Abstract 
Type of thesis: Degree Project in Business Administration for Master of Science in Business 
and Economics 
University: University of Gothenburg School of Business, Economics and Law  
Semester: Spring 2014 
Authors: Jennifer Aychouh and Sofia Carling 
Tutors: Jan Marton and Emmeli Runesson 
Title: Enforcement – can it explain the difference in the development of goodwill within the 
European Union? 
 
Background and Problem discussion: In 2005 IFRS became mandatory to follow in the EU. 
All countries within the EU are forced to report under the standard-setting body called IASB. 
By making IFRS mandatory, one single framework is provided to the member countries. 
Because differences in the development of goodwill have been observed, this thesis will try to 
reveal if enforcement can explain the differences in the development of goodwill among the 
countries within the EU.  
Purpose: The purpose is to find out if enforcement in fact can explain the difference in the 
development of goodwill, as the ratio goodwill as a part of total assets, within the EU. Since 
previous research has touched the subject, we want to examine if we can confirm that 
enforcement, on a country level, plays a role in the development of goodwill.   
Delimitations: The study does not include countries outside of the EU and is limited to 
companies within the EU that follow IFRS and has goodwill in their financial statements. We 
have decided to exclude following countries; Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, since they have 
not been members of the EU during the entire test period, 2005-2012. We do not consider 
data before 2005, when IFRS became mandatory in the EU, nor do we test data after 2012.  
Research design: The study is designed to discover if differences in the development of 
goodwill is related to enforcement between 2005 and 2012 and will include goodwill as a part 
of total assets among the chosen years and countries. To accomplish this, data from a database 
is collected and statistically tested through multiple OLS regressions. This makes the study 
quantitative. 
Results and Conclusions: By examining enforcement, one of nine regressions proves that it 
can explain the existing differences in the development of goodwill among countries within 
the EU. In the outcome of the remaining eight tests, there is no significant evidence that 
enforcement in fact can explain the development of goodwill. Also, we have been able to 
confirm that there is a difference between the development of Goodwill/Total Assets and 
Goodwill/Intangible Assets. The intangible assets has increased more in relation to goodwill, 
than what total assets have, which is an interesting finding and will be suggested for further 
research. 
Suggestions for further research: We suggest a similar study but with other proxies of 
enforcement. Our thesis considers enforcement on a country level, which opens up for two 
different directions.  One suggestion is a study that examines enforcement on a firm level. The 
other suggestion is to examine the development of enforcement within a country, in order to 
exclude underlying country factors and capture the essence. Due to our findings regarding the 
fact that intangible assets has increased more than total assets, in relation to goodwill, it would 
be interesting to conduct a study that examines IFRS 3. 
Keywords: goodwill, enforcement, IFRS, monitoring, compliance and judgment. 
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1. Introduction 
In the first chapter, the background is introduced. It is followed by the problem discussion, 
research question and the purpose. Finally, the contribution, delimitations and the disposition 
are presented.  
1.1 Background 
In 2005 it became mandatory to follow International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
the European Union (EU). All countries within the EU are forced to report under the standard-
setting body called International Accounting Standard Board (IASB).  The aim with IFRS is 
that the adoption of IFRS generates benefits such as: “to eliminate barriers to cross border 
investing; to increase the reliability, transparency and comparability of financial reports; to 
increase market efficiency; and to decrease the cost of capital” (Brown 2011, p. 272).  
A widely-held view is that the IASB standards are principles-based. They consist of clear 
statements without detailed guidance of the implementation which provides room for 
professional judgments and interpretations of the qualitative principles (Marton, Lumsden, 
Lundqvist & Pettersson 2013). The article by Brown (2011) states that adoption of 
international accounting standards by countries will not automatically lead to the same 
outcomes for all companies. This means that the standards are differently applied within the 
countries in the EU, which leads to a great responsibility for the supervision of the 
implementation to ensure that the objectives of the standards are fulfilled. In EU, the 
monitoring system is issued on a national basis, where each country’s supervisory controls its 
own companies’ implementation of IFRS. The European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), former Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), represent the general 
surveillance of all the national authorities in the EU. (ESMA 2014b) 
Regarding the question how to manage goodwill, it has been found that there in fact is a 
difference between how countries handle and report goodwill. For example, a difference has 
been stated between Sweden and the United States (US), in the ratio goodwill as a part of total 
assets (Catasus, Carrington, Eklöv-Alander, Johed, Marton, Lundqvist & Runesson 2014). 
Further, Markovic and Senay Oguz (2011), show that there are differences regarding 
management of goodwill, between countries within the EU, as well as between the EU and the 
US. By making IFRS mandatory in the EU, one single framework is provided to the member 
countries. Despite this, there is an observed difference in the development of goodwill, 
making the quality of the financial reports unequal. Markovic and Senay Oguz (2011) 
consider this being a consequence of a distinction in the quality of enforcement. Therefore, it 
is interesting to single out enforcement as a factor to study, whether it can explain the 
difference in the development of goodwill, among countries within the EU.  
1.2 Problem discussion and purpose 
Due to previous research, it has been shown that enforcement is a factor to be reckoned with 
when studying how financial reports correspond with IFRS. The definition of enforcement 
that will permeate this thesis complies with the definition stated by Brown, Preiato and Tarca 
(2014): “accounting enforcement is the activities undertaken by independent bodies 
(monitoring, reviewing, educating and sanctioning) to promote firms’ compliance with 
accounting standards in their statutory financial statements”. 
As mentioned earlier, it is stated that there are differences in the ratio goodwill as a part of 
total assets among countries. Because the standards are principles-based this provides room 
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for judgments, and the outcome of goodwill accounting will differ. Since judgment is 
subjective, it provides an opportunity for managers to interpret the standards in a beneficial 
manner and hence affecting the development of goodwill. By inviting subjectivity into the 
regulation, a contradiction arises between subjectivity and comparability, unless there is a 
functional supervision.  
Besides the same accounting standards, other factors are also relevant to accounting quality. 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) has found that cross-country differences in accounting quality 
will remain after the IFRS adoption until all institutional differences are removed. Accounting 
quality is thus determined by countries institutional systems and firm´s incentives for 
financial reporting (Ball, Robin & Shuang Wu 2003). Since the regulation is principles-based, 
Catasus et al. (2014) claim that it is likely that monitoring is required in order to handle the 
judgments.  This, in combination with the findings of Cai, Rahman and Courtenay (2008), 
that differences in local enforcement among countries inhibits an improvement of the overall 
accounting quality within the EU, makes the enforcement relevant.  
Brown (2011) indicates that the differences in benefits achieved by adopting IFRS can, 
among other things, depend on both the nature of the standards used before the change to 
IFRS, and the degree of compliance monitoring and enforcement. In accordance with this, 
Pope and McLeay (2011) mention that there is indirect evidence on compliance and 
enforcement being uneven, among the countries that have implemented IFRS, which is 
associated with economic incentives. 
With regard to IFRS, proxies are unable to fully capture the real differences in enforcement 
across countries (Pope & McLeay 2011). Previous, there have not been measures of the 
effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms in different countries, but in 2014, Brown, Preiato 
and Tarca created an index that can be used as a broad measure of country differences in 
enforcement of accounting standards. Despite the instability and the limitations in the index, 
they considered it as a useful key for ranking the enforcement between countries, which is 
required for this thesis. To ensure that the measurement of enforcement is in accordance with 
the reality, two additional indexes in form of earnings management and corruption perception 
are tested for as well. Since earnings management can be used to affect the financial 
accounting, preparers will have incentives to affect the accounting of goodwill (Garcia Osma 
& Pope 2011).  Also, since corruption can be assumed to occur on a lower level in a more 
open and accessible society, this can be used as a broad measure of transparency (Leuz 2010) 
(Ball et al. 2003). 
The purpose is to find out if enforcement in fact can explain the difference in the development 
of goodwill, as the ratio goodwill as a part of total assets, within the EU.  Since previous 
research has touched upon the subject, we want to go deeper and see if we can confirm that 
enforcement, on a country level, plays a role in the development of goodwill.   
Given that there are differences in enforcement, it is interesting to verify if enforcement in 
fact can explain the difference in how to treat goodwill, which leads on to the research 
question; can enforcement explain the difference in the development of goodwill within the 
EU?  
1.3 Contribution 
Previous research has found that there is a difference in the reporting of goodwill between the 
US and Sweden but also within the EU (Markovic & Senay Oguz 2011, Catasus et al. 2014). 
Due to this, our thesis will examine the importance of enforcement in the establishment of 
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financial reports. Our contribution is to evaluate whether enforcement is a factor that may 
cause different outcomes in the reporting of goodwill for users of the same framework, or not. 
Further, a discussion of underlying reasons that may cause the differences will be held. 
1.4 Delimitations 
The study does not include countries outside of the EU and is limited to companies within the 
EU that follow IFRS and has goodwill in their financial statements. The following countries 
are members in the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We have decided to exclude the following 
countries; Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania, since they have not been members of the EU 
during the entire test period, 2005-2012. (European Union 2014) 
We do not consider data before IFRS became mandatory in the EU in 2005. Nor do we test 
data after 2012, when all information containing companies for 2013 is not yet published. The 
time period therefore runs between 2005 and 2012.  
1.5 Outline 
  
•In the first chapter the background is introduced. It is followed by 
the problem discussion, research question and the purpose. Finally, 
the contribution, delimitations and the disposition are presented.  
Introduction 
•In the second chapter, the institutional background is introduced. 
The accounting standards regarding the management of goodwill 
and the organization within the EU concerning enforcement are 
presented.  
Institutional background 
•The third chapter describes the previous research concerning 
goodwill and enforcement. Thereafter, the hypothesis of the thesis 
is presented. 
Hypothesis 
development 
•The fourth chapter describes the method that presents the 
approach  of the collection of data, as well as control of data, 
processing of data and the statistical testing. Further, the variables 
are presented.  
Research design 
•In the fifth chapter, the empirical results are presented. First, a 
description of the data is introduced and thereafter, the outcome 
of the statistical  testing is presented. 
Empirical results  
•In the sixth chapter, the hypothesis development and the empirical 
results are analyzed. The chapter is divided into three sections, 
starting with the development of goodwill, followed by a discussion 
regarding the hypothesis and ends with a further analysis. 
Analysis 
•In the seventh and final chapter, conclusions are stated and the 
research question is answered. Also, this chapter contains 
suggestions for further research. 
Conclusion 
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2. Institutional background 
In the second chapter, the institutional background is introduced. The accounting standards 
regarding the management of goodwill and the organization within the EU concerning 
enforcement are presented.  
2.1 Accounting standards 
Before 2005, the financial accounting was regulated on a national basis. Several of the 
countries’ frameworks were rules-based and practiced amortization of goodwill. This 
regulation was easy to apply but did not always reflect the real economic situation of the 
company. The implementation of IFRS provided a harmonization of the accounting regulation 
in the EU. The new standards issued by IASB are principles-based and require assessments, in 
order to capture the underlying economic reality. This promotes the comparability of the 
financial accounting, since the management makes judgments of their own company’s 
financial situation (Catasus et al. 2014). The difficulty with this type of regulation is that it 
depends on the fact that neutral assessments are required. Sometimes, there can be incentives 
for the management to make subjective judgments, which damage the neutrality. In order to 
be able to handle this principles-based regulation, Catasus et al. (2014) state that it is likely 
that monitoring is required.  
Since 2005, IFRS is the regulatory framework for all countries within the EU. IASB has 
developed three standards that define and manage goodwill: IFRS 3 Business combinations, 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36 Impairments and IAS 38 Intangible assets and 
goodwill. In addition, a conceptual framework is available defining an asset as a resource that 
is controlled by an entity as a result of past events from which future economic benefits are 
expected to flow to the entity (Conceptual framework 49a). Since goodwill is an intangible 
asset, the further definition is found in IAS 38.8 as an identified non-monetary asset that is not 
physical in nature. Goodwill can be acquired in two ways: through internally generated 
goodwill and through business combination, but only the last method is allowed according to 
IAS 38.48. The amount of goodwill is measured as the excess from the cost of the acquisition 
over the net of the acquisition-date of the identified and acquired assets and liabilities (IFRS 
3.32). After the acquisition, and in order to be able to make an impairment test, the goodwill 
shall be allocated to the cash-generating unit that will expect benefit from the acquisition (IAS 
36.80).  
Through the introduction of IFRS 3 in 2004, amortization of goodwill ceased and an, at least 
annually, an impairment test shall be done. This is made by comparing the carrying amount of 
the cash-generating unit including goodwill with its recoverable amount, which is the higher 
of the net selling price and the value in use (IAS 36.90) (Deloitte 2014). If the carrying 
amount exceeds the recoverable amount, an impairment loss is recognized. Further, an 
impairment loss of goodwill can never be reversed (IAS 36.124). 
2.2 European authority 
ESMA is a part of the European System of Financial Supervision which is a system that 
consists of the European Systemic Risk Board and three other authorities: ESMA, the 
European Banking Authority, and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (ESMA 2014c). Since 2011, ESMA is an independent authority in EU with a 
mission to harmonize the monitoring in EU (ESMA 2014b). ESMA works with the legislative 
system for securities, which leads to more effective regulation and supervision and a better 
protection for the investors. They have developed a four level approach, where one of the 
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levels aims to streamline the supervisory practices regarding financial supervision within EU 
through guidelines and recommendations. ESMA can, on its own initiative or at request from 
other instances, for example, the European Parliament, perform an investigation and issue a 
recommendation to the respective national authority. The policy decisions of ESMA are 
handled by the heads of each national authority in the 28 countries within EU that, together 
with a couple of observers, form ESMA’s board of supervisors (ESMA 2014a). 
 
Though the legal responsibility for enforcement still remains on a national level, the CESR, 
that was replaced by ESMA in 2011, has the responsibility to develop and implement a 
common approach to the enforcement of IFRS (European Parliament 2008) (ESMA 2014b). 
To be able to ensure effective enforcement of compliance with IFRS, the CESR issued two 
standards with necessary criteria for the national regulators to follow. 
 
The first standard; Standard No. 1 on Financial Information: Enforcement of Standards on 
Financial Information in Europe contains basic principles and minimum criteria for how the 
enforcement of IFRS is supposed to be handled by each member of the EU. It states that 
competent, independent authorities should perform enforcement reviews. If the authority 
reveals material that is incorrect and does not comply with the framework, they are “required 
to take appropriate actions in a timely and consistent fashion” (Pope & McLeay 2011, p 16). 
The second standard; Standard No. 2 on Financial Information: Coordination of Enforcement 
Activities, established a database where the national enforcers can find guidance through cases 
and decisions made within the enforcement standards and also conduct a dialogue between 
others. This database is not available to the public; only the national authorities can access it. 
The second standard is not properly followed by the members, and the CESR finds that only 
31 % applies all its principles (CESR 2009).  
  
6 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
The third chapter describes the previous research concerning goodwill and enforcement. 
Thereafter, the hypothesis of the thesis is presented. 
3.1 Previous research  
When adopting IFRS, countries can gain benefits, mostly regarding equity markets (Brown 
2011). He also states that by eliminating barriers between countries and following the same 
regulation, a more reliable, transparent and comparable situation can be achieved for the 
financial reports. In turn, this benefits investors in facilitating acts across countries, which 
increases the market efficiency and reduces the cost of capital. Even though these are benefits 
that possibly can be achieved by adopting IFRS unlike local regulations, Brown (2011) 
declares that there are differences in the benefits among countries. He also describes that the 
differences of gaining benefits for example depend on the nature of the national standards 
before adopting IFRS, and the country’s degree of compliance monitoring and enforcement. 
Brown and Clinch (1998) reflect on earlier research that the accounting standards, applied 
before IFRS differs among countries because of differences in economic and social forces that 
have imprinted the country´s domestic standards. The standards issued by IASB are strongly 
influenced by the English legal origin traditions (Leuz 2010). In the article by LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), it is stated that common law is English in 
origin and civil law is derived from Roman law. Within the civil law tradition, there are three 
major families that modern laws originate from: French, German and Scandinavian. Laws 
vary among countries because of differences in legal origin. When countries that do not 
originate from the same tradition adopt IFRS it will automatically lead to different outcomes 
(Brown 2011). 
Another explanatory factor for differences in benefits gained from adopting IFRS is, 
according to Brown (2011) the degree of compliance monitoring and enforcement. The article 
by Pope and McLeay (2011) mentions that results of adopting IFRS and the implementation 
are not equal among countries within Europe, and that it depends on the preparer of the 
financial statements incentives and the effectiveness of local enforcement. EU’s proposal to 
harmonize financial reporting with IFRS was developed normatively, based on principles that 
are well argued, suggesting potential economic benefits that can arise as a result of the 
adoption. Further, Pope and McLeay (2011) say that to be able to share benefits as, for 
example, a positive capital market, the institutional settings in each respective country have a 
significant role. The evidence that is stated in the article is that results are far from uniform 
among the EU due to preparer incentives and different enforcement structures in the member 
states. They also mention that regulators have expressed that the idea with harmonization of 
financial reporting based on IFRS will lead to a reduction in cost of capital and hence wider 
economic effects. Pope and McLeay also mention that there are reasons to believe that the 
benefits will only occur if implementation and enforcement are of high quality. 
Further, Pope and McLeay (2011) state that “the degree of compliance with IFRS depend on 
preparers’ incentives, which in part depend on the quality of enforcement” (p. 249). They 
present that studies have proved unequal compliance with IFRS in Europe. According to Leuz 
(2010), principles-based standards give companies more discretion which can give managers 
the opportunity to convey private information to the markets in a more affordable matter. In 
turn, the discretion can be misused by managers to pursue hidden reporting motives. 
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Brown (2011) mention in his article that a lot of studies argue for higher quality of the 
financial statements as a positive consequence that follows when adopting IFRS.  Pope and 
McLeay (2011), on the other hand, say that evidence has shown that IFRS does not in fact 
lead to automatic improvements in accounting quality although it appears to have contributed 
to a higher degree of comparability. Essential keys of determinants of accounting quality are 
the incentives and constraints facing preparers, and the other way around, incentives depend 
on both firm-level and country-level quality of enforcement and incentives. As well, they 
mention a significant view from the paper by Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi’s (2008), regarding 
their results that the estimated effects of IFRS on market outcomes are significant only in 
countries where reporting and enforcement are high. 
Ball et al. (2003) study the collision of standards and incentives, in an article where they find 
companies in East Asia to have strong incentives to manipulate and thus report smoothed 
earnings. They state that quality is what a country's institutional environment demands. By 
accepting their finding about earnings management, a parallel can be drawn to accounting of 
goodwill. If companies are willing to smooth their results for better appearance for investors 
and on the market, there may also be an incentive to manipulate accounting of goodwill; 
hence enforcement plays a critical role. 
3.2 The hypothesis 
Considering the fact that differences in local enforcement among countries within the EU 
hamper improvements in accounting quality (Cai et al. 2008), a similarity can be drawn to the 
development of goodwill. Due to different local enforcement and, as mentioned earlier, firms’ 
incentives, a study will be carried out to try to answer if the dissimilarities in local 
enforcement can be the relevant factor which generates differences in the development of 
goodwill. This leads us to the following hypothesis. 
 
 
H1: Enforcement can explain the difference in the development of goodwill within the EU 
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4. Research design 
The fourth chapter describes the method that presents the approach of the collection of data, 
as well as control of data, processing of data and the statistical testing. Further, the variables 
are presented.  
4.1 Choice of method 
This thesis aims to answer the underlying question about whether enforcement can explain the 
difference in development of goodwill accounting within countries who apply the same 
framework. The main thought is that what causes the difference between the countries 
depends on the extent of the national supervision. 
Hence, the starting point will be in enforcement but also other variables matters. The study is 
designed to discover if differences in development of goodwill are related to enforcement 
between 2005 and 2012 and will include goodwill as a part of total assets among the chosen 
years and countries. In addition, robustness tests will be carried out with the dependent 
variables goodwill, as a part of intangible assets among the chosen years and countries, as 
well as impairments of goodwill as a part of total assets before impairments are made. To 
accomplish this, data from a database is required. This makes the study quantitative.  
4.2 Collection of information 
In this thesis literature in the form of articles, databases, research reports and printed material 
has been used. To find relevant and informative articles and literature, the databases available 
at Gothenburg University Library has been a great source. The most useful databases have 
been Datastream, Web of Science and Harvard Business Source Premier. Some of the 
keywords used are goodwill, enforcement, IFRS, monitoring, compliance and judgment. 
Since data for this study must be collected from a large, unbiased sample, when making 
generalizations about a large population, Datastream is used. The data is collected from period 
2005-2012, which makes 2005 the base year. The data collected was for companies from all 
countries within the EU except for the three countries that were not members in 2005, 
Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. Also, in the variable Market Capitalization, exchange rates 
have been adjusted to Euro through a function in Datastream. 
4.3 Control of data  
In the thesis we have received data by using Goodwill/Cost in Excess of Assets Purchased, 
Net in relation to Total Assets. We have compared the data with financial statements to make 
sure that the data is accurate and useful in our testing. Goodwill/Cost in Excess of Assets 
Purchased, Net is equal to Total Goodwill and this is verified by controlling approximately 20 
different financial statements from the companies in our data, regarding the years 2005-2012. 
Therefore, Total Goodwill will hereby be referred to as Goodwill.  
4.4 Processing data 
By processing the data, 18 636 companies were retrieved. When the data was sorted, 
following criteria have been taken into consideration; if companies follow IFRS, if companies 
appear multiple times, companies without goodwill and companies who have not reported any 
goodwill. The remaining sample consisted of 2 285 companies over a time period of eight 
years, which resulted in 18 280 observations. Also, by adjusting for outliers, identified by 
three standard errors from mean (Anderson, Sweeney & Williams 2011), several observations 
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were excluded. Furthermore, some observations were not included in the study due to values 
larger than 1 in the dependent variables Goodwill/Total Assets, Goodwill/Intangible Assets 
and Impairments of Goodwill. The final population that will be tested for in the regression 
models consists of 13 738 observations. 
In the data, error is assumed not to have an impact at all and therefore, it is ignored in the 
study. Since the thesis consists of all companies in the EU that fulfills our criteria, we have a 
large population which enhances the validity. 
4.5 Statistical testing 
To be able to examine if enforcement can explain differences in the development of goodwill 
within the EU, statistical testing must be done.  In this thesis, a multiple OLS regression 
model, with clusters by firm, is used to test the hypothesis. By using Stata, the multiple 
regression models were formed in order to analyze and process the collected data. To ensure 
that multicollinearity does not affect the regressions, the correlations between the variables 
are tested.  
Through robustness testing, two alternative dependent variables have been applied in the 
regression to see if the same results are obtained. This to be able to either confirm our 
findings, or to question them. 
4.6 Variables 
The concept of enforcement comprises many different factors and therefore, the level of 
enforcement is difficult to verify because there is no accurate measurement to access. Hence, 
proxies are used and tested in order to ensure a valid analysis of the enforcement variables. 
Control variables are used to exclude effects from underlying factors that can affect the 
development of goodwill. The proxies of enforcement and the traditions are presented in a 
table in the Appendix. 
4.6.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variable is the one variable that is being tested against the other variables. The 
main dependent variable is Goodwill/Total Assets. Also, two other dependent variables are 
tested for, namely; Goodwill/Intangible Assets and Impairments of Goodwill. These are tested 
in order to present an additional dimension of the development of goodwill. 
4.6.2 Enforcement variables  
Index of enforcement   
Brown et al. (2014) have created an index of countries’ differences in enforcement of 
accounting standards including 51 countries, where 22 of them are members of the EU. When 
making the index of enforcement, Brown et al. (2014) focus on the financial reporting 
enforcement which complies with the definition of enforcement used in this thesis. The 
selection of items included in the index is those who are likely to affect the investors’ 
decisions through the quality of the available information on the capital market. The factors 
that the index of enforcement are based on are if there is a body that monitors financial 
reporting, if the body has power to set accounting standards, if the body reviews and provides 
a report, if enforcement actions are taken with regard to the financial statements and lastly the 
level of resourcing. To ensure the relevance of the selected items, eleven interviews with 
security market regulators and audit partners were held and adjustments according to their 
objections were made. Each factor provides a ranking score and the total score for each 
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country, between 2 and 24, will be used as a measure of enforcement. Since the ranking was 
made for 2002, 2005 and 2008, the average from the years 2005 and 2008 was used as proxy 
in order to adjust the index to this thesis with the testing period 2005-2012.  
Earnings Management 
Leuz et al. (2003) have documented systematic differences in earnings management between 
the years 1990-1999, with an update from Leuz (2010) covering the years 1996-2005. Their 
definition of earnings management is “the alteration of firms’ reported economic performance 
by insiders to either mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes” (Leuz et 
al. 2003, p. 506).  One measure of earnings management that Leuz et al. (2003) use is 
“smoothing” the results, which is done to reduce the variability of reported earnings. Garcia 
Osma and Pope (2011) have created a similar index as Leuz et al., with more updated 
numbers covering the years 2004-2008, between 30 countries, whereof 14 of them are 
members of the EU. Since earnings management can be used to affect the financial 
accounting, an assumption is made that preparers will also have incentives to affect the 
accounting of goodwill. The ranking is from 1-30, where a higher score implies less earnings 
management. The level of earnings management in each country shows which protection the 
investors have from insiders’ incentives to manage the result of private control benefits. 
Therefore, the comparison of earnings management and investor protection that Garcia Osma 
and Pope (2011) have created with numbers from 2004-2008 can be used as a proxy for 
enforcement in the thesis.  
Corruption Perception Index 
Transparency International (2014) has made a ranking, including 177 countries, called 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in order to capture perceptions from “those in a position to 
offer assessments of public sector corruption” in each country. The scale is 0-100, and the 
higher the score, the more the country is perceived as clean. Transparency International 
(2014) defines corruption as activities that intentionally are illegal and that only emerge 
through investigations. Therefore, CPI can be used as a broad measure of transparency, since 
corruption can be assumed to occur on a lower level in a more open and accessible society. In 
the EU, each national authority has the task to promote market confidence and protect 
investors (CESR 2010). This will be achieved by encouraging transparency in the financial 
information that is relevant to investors’ decisions. With the perception of the corruption 
measured on a country level, we assume that it permeates the national authority and its 
mission, which in turn affects the transparency. Hence, the CPI is a relevant proxy since it 
reflects countries’ transparency and investor protection.  The relation between a high level of 
enforcement and transparency is supported by both Leuz (2010) and Ball et al. (2003); 
therefore the CPI is used as a measurement of enforcement in the thesis.  
4.6.3 Control variables 
In order to exclude spurious relationships between the variables in the regression, control 
variables are included in the model. This to be able to ensure that the observed correlation 
between two variables consists of an accurate connection and is not in fact caused by a third 
variable. 
Market Capitalization 
A control variable that captures the market value of the company and indicates its economic 
situation, is market capitalization. According to studies made by Churyk (2005) there is, when 
the market capitalization declines, an increase in the impairments of goodwill. Further, 
Markovic and Senay Oguz (2011) found the same negative correlation between market 
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capitalization and impairments of goodwill. Because of this connection it is necessary to 
include market capitalization as one of the control variables. 
Debt-to-Equity ratio  
Since market capitalization only captures the equity value of a company, it is necessary to 
include another control variable that capture companies with different capital structure, such 
as companies in debt. This can be achieved by adding debt-to-equity ratio as a control 
variable. If companies have high debt levels, they may have fewer tendencies to make 
impairments of goodwill, since this affects the equity ratio. Impairments of goodwill decrease 
the result and the equity which thereby leads to a lower equity ratio.  
Price-to-Book ratio 
According to IAS 36, an impairment of goodwill is required when the carrying amount is 
higher than the recoverable amount. This can be captured by using the price-to-book ratio as a 
control variable since it is the relationship between market value and book value. If the price-
to-book ratio is less than 1, an impairment loss shall be recognized. 
Return on Equity 
Return on equity is profit in relation to shareholder´s equity. It is a measure of how expensive 
it is for the company to create profit and is therefore a measurement of profitability. It is 
important to use a control variable as return on equity in order to control for incentives that 
can arise when companies are profitable.  According to an interview with Ingblad in the thesis 
by Bylander and Ottosson (2010), incentives to make impairments of goodwill can arise when 
the company has a high profit that management wants to reduce. When achieving a high 
result, shareholders want dividends and management may try to reduce the result to keep the 
money within the company. Hence, impairments of goodwill are made to reduce the 
distributable equity.  
Year 
The years that will be included in the thesis are 2005-2012. The development of goodwill will 
vary among the years but it has nothing to do with enforcement. By using year as a dummy 
variable, the regression is used to acknowledge the difference in goodwill, more specifically, 
the development of goodwill over the years.  
Industry 
The development of goodwill will likely vary among industries, more specifically; among 
supersectors. In the thesis, supersector is used as a category of industry but will be referred to 
as industry. By having industry as a dummy variable it is possible to distinguish the impact on 
the dependent variable that the control variable has. Some industries may show significant 
effects, which with further analysis can reveal evidence concerning different developments in 
goodwill among different industries.  
Countries 
Since the three proxies of enforcement are based on a country level, countries must be 
involved in the regression as a control variable, in order to ensure that there is no effect from a 
third variable. By using countries as a dummy variable it is possible to control that the impact 
on the dependent variable that the control variable has, is not due to the countries.  
Traditions 
According to Brown (2011), countries that adopt IFRS and do not originate from the same 
tradition will automatically get different outcomes. Thus, accounting traditions are used as a 
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control variable. Within EU there are, according to  La Porta et al. (1998), four original 
accounting traditions: one equals origin in English common law, the second is the origin in 
the French commercial code, the third is the origin in the German commercial code and the 
fourth equals the origin in the Scandinavian civil law. Leuz (2010) mention that legal origin 
may act as a summary measure for a country´s approach to a number of regulatory issues and 
this could hence have significant explanatory power in regressions involving country 
variables. In this thesis we use an index from Leuz (2010) from which the countries included 
are categorized according to which tradition they belong, and are therefore a part of the 
regression as a dummy variable.  
4.6.4 Outliers 
When sorting for outliers there are different approaches. By considering the sample, an 
assortment of the data is crucial. This to make sure that those extreme values of observed 
variables do not distort the estimates of regression coefficients nor will they be misleading. In 
Stata there are different ways to provide for outliers and a small discussion about two 
commands will be mentioned here. 
The first one, “extremes”, can be used to present the values of the existing outliers. By 
identifying those to be a value that are greater than +/- 3 standard deviations from mean, one 
can manually remove the outliers, based on an assessment drawn from an empirical rule 
(Anderson, Sweeney & Williams 2011). The other approach, “winsor”, is the transformation 
of statistics; by limiting extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the effect of outliers. 
Rather than dropping outlying observations,”winsor” replaces the extreme values of a variable 
with the values at certain percentiles. 
If outliers are not excluded, it can distort the estimates of regression coefficients. Regarding 
the independent variable, Market Capitalization, the natural logarithm is used to correct for 
outliers and thereby Market Capitalization will be normal distributed.  
To obtain an accurate population, it is of great importance to remove or replace the outliers. A 
disadvantage with “winsor” is that the researcher assumes that outliers lie only at the extremes 
of the variables’ distribution. Therefore, “extremes” are used in our study as well as the 
natural logarithm for the independent variable Market Capitalization.  
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4.6.5 Variable Summary 
Table 1: Variable summary 
Variable Name Abbreviation In model 
Dependent Goodwill/Total Assets gt Goodwill/Total Assets 
Dependent Goodwill/Intangible Assets gi Goodwill/Intangible Assets 
Dependent Impairments of Goodwill imp Impairments of Goodwill/(Total 
Assets+Impairments of Goodwill) 
Independent Index of Enforcement ioe Index of Enforcement 
Independent Earnings Management em Earnings Management 
Independent Corruption Perception Index cpi Corruption Perception Index  
Independent/control Price-to-Book Ratio  pb Share Price/Book Value per share. 
Independent/control Market Capitalization mc Market Capitalization 
Independent/control Debt-to-Equity Ratio  de Long Term Debt/Common Equity  
Independent/control Return on Equity  re Net Income/Last year’s Common Equity 
Independent/dummy Year  2005-2012 
Independent/dummy Industry  Cluster of Industry, supersector 
Independent/dummy Country  Country 
Independent/dummy Tradition  Accounting Tradition 
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5. Empirical results 
In the fifth chapter, the empirical results are presented. First, a description of the data is 
introduced and thereafter, the outcome of the statistical testing is presented. 
5.1 Description of the data 
Since all companies that follow IFRS have not reported goodwill, these are excluded from the 
sample in order for it only to contain observations with recognized goodwill. This action is 
taken due to the fact that companies without any reported goodwill will not contribute to the 
study.  
From the sample, the development of goodwill over the years 2005-2012 will be measured as 
Goodwill/Total Assets, Goodwill/Intangible Assets and Impairments of Goodwill. An average 
value of the development of goodwill within EU over the years, is shown in table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The development of goodwill differs between the two measures Goodwill/Total Assets and 
Goodwill/Intangible Assets. Goodwill as a part of total assets increases during the years 2005-
2009, followed by three years of a relatively small fluctuation. Goodwill as a part of 
intangible assets on the other hand, decreases during the whole period. Impairments of 
Goodwill has fluctuated among the years 2005-2012. 
  
  
Table 2: The development of goodwill 
year gt gi imp 
2005 12,67% 70,19% 1,10% 
2006 12,99% 69,45% 1,84% 
2007 13,75% 69,36% 0,85% 
2008 14,00% 67,95% 1,46% 
2009 14,50% 67,55% 1,27% 
2010 14,48% 67,31% 1,20% 
2011 14,31% 66,39% 1,83% 
2012 14,46% 65,51% 0,74% 
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5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
In table 3, descriptive data of the variables used in the regressions are presented.  
 
 
1
 The natural logarithm of Market Capitalization 
 
  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  
    
  
gt 12 056 0,1396 0,1526 1,64E-07 0,9654 
gi 12 056 0,6797 0,2843 0,0002 1 
imp 1 653 0,0132 0,0461 0 0,6958 
  
    
  
ioe 13 134 41,3488 10,3869 23,25 56,5 
em 12 215 12,9536 7,5009 6,25 25,25 
cpi 13 738 70,3752 14,8466 40 91 
  
    
  
pb 13 398 2,2784 8,5788 0 496,32 
de 13 668 79,9904 206,4306 0 4 885,39 
re 13 441 7,1703 28,7456 -297,33 308,87 
mc1 13 489 12,3600 2,1734 5,4027 17,2318 
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5.1.2 Correlation  
In table 4, the correlations between the variables are presented.  
              Table 4: The correlation between the variables 
 
A problem that may occur when using multiple regressions is multicollinearity; if the 
independent variables are strongly correlated to each other, it may cause difficulties when 
interpreting the output. Therefore, it is of great importance to ensure that there is no 
multicollinearity among the independent variables; this is done by controlling that the 
correlation is not stronger than 0,7. (Anderson et al. 2011)  
The fact that the three measures of enforcement (cpi, em and ioe) correlate does not have a 
negative impact on our study since they are tested separately and with the purpose of 
capturing the degree of enforcement in different ways.  
5.2 Testing of the hypothesis 
H1 = Enforcement can explain the difference in the development of goodwill within the EU 
The development of goodwill will be tested as Goodwill/Total Assets, along with the three 
different proxies for the degree of enforcement as independent variables. This result in three 
gt gi imp cpi em ioe pb de re mc¹
gt 1.0000 
gi 0.4026 1.0000 
0.0000
imp 0.1872 0.0377 1.0000 
0.0000 0.1337
cpi 0.1760 0.0877 0.0563 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0222
em 0.2151 0.1174 0.1357 0.5710 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ioe 0.2169 0.1192 0.0976 0.9517 0.7921 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
pb 0.0178 -0.0262 -0.0034 0.0268 0.0634 0.0416 1.0000 
0.0533 0.0044 0.8906 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000
de -0.0720 0.0082 -0.0380 -0.0590 -0.0612 -0.0644 0.1170 1.0000 
0.0000 0.3663 0.1228 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
re -0.0291 0.0167 -0.2501 0.0824 0.0665 0.0791 -0.0353 -0.1504 1.0000 
0.0015 0.0686 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
mc¹ -0.0469 -0.0489 -0.1646 0.0691 0.0713 0.0733 0.0436 0.0961 0.3001 1.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1 The natural logarithm of Market Capitalization
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different regression models where the control variables will remain fixed during the entire 
testing.  
Further, robustness testing will be done to ensure that the dependent variable is not influenced 
by chance. The question is whether it is a coincidence or if it will be the same result when 
testing with a different dependent variable, representing the same phenomenon. In this case, 
both Goodwill/Intangible Assets and Impairments of Goodwill will be tested. 
            Table 5: The result of the regressions with Goodwill/Total Assets as the dependent variable 
 
( )                                                                         
( )                                                                        
( )                                                                         
 
   
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Index of Enforcement -0.0909 
  
 
(0.251) 
  Earnings Management 
 
-0.0088 
 
  
(0.267) 
 Corruption Perception Index 
  
-0.0109*** 
   
(0.000) 
    Price-to-Book Ratio  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 
(0.216) (0.201) (0.217) 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio  -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.963) (0.884) (0.969) 
Return on Equity  -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Capitalization 0.0049*** 0.0049*** 0.0048*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
    Observations 11 288 10 566 11 531 
R-squared 0.279 0.273 0.283 
Robust p-value in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
    gt = Dependent variable, Goodwill/Total Assets 
  year = Dummy variable 
   industry = Dummy variable 
   country = Dummy variable 
   tradition = Dummy variable 
   
In table 5, the three regressions with the dependent variable Goodwill/Total Assets and the 
different proxies for enforcement are shown. The only proxy of enforcement that is significant 
is the Corruption Perception Index at a level of 0,01. All three coefficients for the proxies of 
enforcement are negative.  
Further, the two control variables Return on Equity and Market Capitalization are significant 
on a 0,01 level in all three regressions. Return on Equity with negative coefficients and 
Market Capitalization with positive coefficients.  
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The coefficient of determination (R
2
) explains how good the model is, by ranging from 0 to 1 
(Westerlund 2005). The closer R
2
 is to 1, the better the model explains the variation in the 
dependent variable. With Goodwill/Total Assets as the dependent variable, R
2
 for the three 
regressions are approximately 0,28.  
5.3 Robustness testing 
In order to ensure the robustness of Goodwill/Total Assets as the development of goodwill, 
two additional dependent variables will be tested; goodwill as a part of intangible assets and 
impairments of goodwill as a part of total assets before impairments of goodwill. While the 
dependent variable is changed, the remaining variables are constant.  
5.3.1 Goodwill/Intangible Assets 
       Table 6: The result of the regressions with Goodwill/Intangible Assets as the dependent variable 
 
( )                                                                         
( )                                                                        
( )                                                                         
     
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Index of Enforcement -0.0445 
  
 
(0.776) 
  Earnings Management 
 
-0.0048 
 
  
(0.758) 
 Corruption Perception Index 
  
0.0054 
   
(0.474) 
    Price-to-Book Ratio  -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0010** 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.505) (0.584) (0.636) 
Return on Equity  0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.197) (0.162) (0.254) 
Market Capitalization -0.0079** -0.0077** -0.0081** 
 
(0.018) (0.024) (0.014) 
    Observations 11 288 10 566 11 531 
R-squared 0.096 0.090 0.105 
Robust p-value in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
    gi = Dependent variable, Goodwill/Intangible Assets 
  year = Dummy variable 
   industry = Dummy variable 
   country = Dummy variable 
   tradition = Dummy variable 
    
In the regressions with Goodwill/Intangible Assets as the dependent variable, in table 6, none 
of the proxies of enforcement are significant at any level. The coefficients of Index of 
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Enforcement and Earnings Management are negative, while the coefficient of Corruption 
Perception Index is positive.  
The control variables Price-to-Book Ratio and Market Capitalization are both significant with 
p-values less than 0,05 and negative coefficients in all regressions. 
The regressions have coefficients of determination with values around 0,10. 
5.3.2 Impairments of Goodwill 
          Table 7: The result of the regressions with Impairments of Goodwill as the dependent variable 
 
( )                                                                          
( )                                                                         
( )                                                                          
 
   
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
Index of Enforcement -0.0412 
  
 
(0.330) 
  Earnings Management 
 
-0.0041 
 
  
(0.334) 
 Corruption Perception Index 
  
0.0051 
   
(0.331) 
    Price-to-Book Ratio  -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.159) (0.141) (0.158) 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio  -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* 
 
(0.077) (0.051) (0.083) 
Return on Equity  -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Capitalization -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0009 
 
(0.214) (0.171) (0.208) 
    Observations 1 551 1 486 1 562 
R-squared 0.142 0.144 0.142 
Robust p-value in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
    imp = Dependent variable, Impairments/(Total Assets+Impairments) 
year = Dummy variable 
   industry = Dummy variable 
   country = Dummy variable 
   tradition = Dummy variable 
    
As seen in table 7, the three proxies of enforcement are insignificant with p-values larger than 
0,1. The Index of Enforcement and Earnings Management have coefficients with a negative 
coefficient and the Corruption Perception Index has a positive coefficient.  
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The control variable Debt-to-Equity Ratio is significant at a level of 0,1 with negative 
coefficients in all three regressions. Furthermore, the Return on Equity are significant in the 
three regressions with p-values less than 0,01 and negative coefficients. 
The coefficients of determination are nearly 0,15 in the regressions with Goodwill/Intangible 
Assets as dependent variable. 
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6. Analysis 
In the sixth chapter, the hypothesis development and the empirical results are analyzed. The 
chapter is divided into three sections, starting with the development of goodwill, followed by a 
discussion regarding the hypothesis and ends with a further analysis. 
6.1 Development of goodwill 
This thesis concentrates on if the impact of enforcement contributes to the differences of 
development of goodwill over the time period 2005-2012, among countries within the EU. 
Previous research has found that despite the implementation of IFRS in 2005, there are still 
some differences within the EU to take into consideration. We wanted to find out if 
enforcement could be one of the factors that separates the unison of equal reporting in 
financial statements with regard to goodwill.  
To clarify the development of goodwill, expressed as Goodwill/Total Assets, 
Goodwill/Intangible Assets and Impairments of Goodwill, graphs will be presented in graph 1 
– 3. 
 
 
 
Graph 1: The development of Goodwill/Total Assets Graph 2: The development of Goodwill/Intangible Assets 
Graph 3: The development of Impairments of Goodwill Graph 4: The development of Intangible Assets/Total Assets 
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As seen in graph 1 the development of Goodwill/Total Assets over the years in the EU has 
increased until 2009, only to level out during the latter years. The increase in Goodwill/Total 
Assets may depend on an unwillingness to conduct impairments of goodwill, since it is no 
longer allowed to reverse impairments of goodwill. Therefore, a lot of companies show more 
caution regarding the management of goodwill and as a result, there are a number of 
companies with overvalued balance sheets. In recent years, the development of goodwill has 
started to level out, which can be an effect of the recession that started in 2008 and has 
affected the economic situation around the world. A further reason as to why the development 
did not continue to increase may depend on delayed effects of the implementation of IFRS.  
The development of Goodwill/Intangible Assets, in graph 2, has unlike Goodwill/Total Assets, 
decreased over the time period. The finding that intangible assets have increased more than 
total assets in relation to goodwill (graph 4), can indicate an impact from the implementation 
of IFRS 3 Business Combinations. This will be suggested for further research. 
As seen in graph 3, impairments of goodwill have fluctuated during the years. The fact that 
the impairments of goodwill did not significantly increase during the recession that occurred 
during 2008 is worth mentioning. Due to the financial instability in companies, firm values 
were expected to decrease which could have indicated that impairments of goodwill would 
have been necessary.  
6.2 Can enforcement explain the differences in the development of 
goodwill? 
When running the regressions, three different dependent variables were tested for as the 
development of goodwill and three independent variables as proxies for the degree of 
enforcement on a country level. Using these proxies, has shown that the hypothesis is true for 
only one of the nine different regressions. For the other regressions, we are not able to prove 
that enforcement can explain the differences in the development of goodwill among countries 
within the EU.  
6.2.1 Goodwill/Total Assets 
The independent variables Index of Enforcement and Earnings Management are not 
significant with the dependent variable Goodwill/Total Assets, since their p-values are larger 
than 0,1. Therefore, it cannot be proven that enforcement can explain the differences in 
goodwill within the EU. Index of Enforcement and Earnings Management affect the 
development of goodwill negative, thus the higher the enforcement, the smaller effect on the 
development of goodwill.  
Corruption Perception Index has a p-value of 0, 00 and with a significance level at 0,01, there 
are evidence that H1 is proven. Hence the model states that enforcement can explain the 
difference in development of goodwill over the years within the EU. Corruption Perception 
Index has a negative effect on the development of goodwill; the higher the enforcement, the 
smaller effect on the development of goodwill.  
The independent variables Return on Equity and Market Capitalization have p-values that are 
less than the significance level of 0,01. With regards to Return on Equity, the effect on the 
dependent variable is negative, implying that there is a relationship between Return on Equity 
and the development of goodwill; the higher the Return on Equity the lower the effect on 
Goodwill/Total Assets.  Market Capitalization has a positive effect on the dependent variable. 
A higher level of Market Capitalization corresponds with a larger effect on the development 
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of goodwill. The variables Price-to-Book Ratio and Debt-to-Equity Ratio does not have a 
significant effect since their p-values are higher than the significance level 0,1. 
6.2.2 Goodwill/Intangible Assets 
The independent variables Index of Enforcement, Earnings Management and Corruption 
Perception Index are not significant with the dependent variable Goodwill/Intangible Assets, 
since their p-values are larger than 0,1. Hence, there is no evidence that enforcement can 
explain the differences in goodwill within the EU. The independent variables Index of 
Enforcement and Earnings Management effect the development of goodwill negative, thus the 
higher the enforcement, the smaller affect on the development of goodwill. The independent 
variable Corruption Perception Index affect the dependent variable Goodwill/Intangible 
Assets positive; the higher the enforcement, the larger effect on the development of goodwill, 
which is inconsistent with the results found when using Goodwill/Total Assets as the 
dependent variable. 
The variables Price-to-Book Ratio and Market Capitalization have p-values lower than 0,05, 
which makes them significant at a significance level of 0,05. Their effect on the dependent 
variable is negative, hence the higher Price-to-Book and Market Capitalization the lower the 
effect on the development of goodwill. The variables Debt-to-Equity Ratio and Return on 
Equity does not have a significant effect since their p-values are higher than the significance 
level 0,1. 
6.2.3 Impairments of Goodwill  
When testing the dependent variable Impairments of Goodwill, all of the proxies of 
enforcement are shown not to be significant, since their p-values are larger than 0,1. 
Therefore, there is no evidence that enforcement can explain the differences in goodwill 
within the EU. The independent variables Index of Enforcement and Earnings Management 
effect the development of goodwill negative, hence the higher the enforcement the smaller 
effect on the impairments of goodwill, which is inconsistent with the results found when using 
Goodwill/Total Assets as the dependent variable. The independent variable Corruption 
Perception Index affects the dependent variable positive; the higher the enforcement the 
larger effect on the impairments of goodwill.  
The variable Debt-to-Equity Ratio is significant at a significance level of 0,1 and the variable 
Return on Equity is significant at a significance level of 0,01. Their effect on the dependent 
variable is negative, therefore the higher the Debt-to-Equity Ratio and the Return on Equity 
are, the lower the effect on Impairments of Goodwill. The remaining variables Price-to-Book 
Ratio and Market Capitalization does not have a significant effect since their p-values are 
higher than the significance level of 0,1. 
6.2.4 Continued analysis of the proxies 
The result from the regressions partly proves that the hypothesis is true; enforcement can 
explain the differences in the development of goodwill within the EU. Previous research 
(Brown 2011, Pope & McLeay 2011) states that differences between countries may be due to, 
despite implementation of IFRS, differences in the practical application and various local 
monitoring organizations. Brown (2011) also argues that differences will arise because of the 
nature of the local standards that was used before adopting IFRS, and what degree of 
compliance monitoring and enforcement the countries have. This has been taken into 
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consideration by using control variables to ensure that the relationship between enforcement 
and the development of goodwill does not depend on for example, traditions.  
The proxy Corruption Perception Index is used to reveal the relationship between a high level 
of enforcement and transparency, on a country level, which is supported by both Leuz (2010) 
and Ball et al. (2003). The perception of corruption in a country can be assumed to permeate 
the corporate culture, and thereby be reflected in their financial accounting. By conducting an 
open accounting, it reduces room for management to use information for their own benefits. 
Instead, investors will have full insight and thus be able to make decisions on that 
information. As to the proxy Corruption Perception Index, that has shown to be the only 
significant, the degree of transparency has an impact on the development of goodwill. 
Therefore, the more accessible the information is for investors, the smaller the effect on the 
development of goodwill, since the financial statements should reflect the real economic 
situation.  
On the other hand, eight regressions showed no evidence of the fact that enforcement can 
explain differences in the development of goodwill among countries within the EU. Due to 
this, it cannot be verified that enforcement on a country level can explain differences in the 
development of goodwill. The outcome from the regressions reveals that earlier research is in 
line with the issue regarding differences among countries within the EU, despite the same 
framework. In fact, it can depend on other factors or proxies of enforcement; however this 
will not be discussed in this thesis but will be suggested for further research.  
The Index of Enforcement is created by Brown et al. (2014) and is an index of country 
differences in enforcement of accounting standards, more specific; financial reporting 
enforcement. The proxy Index of Enforcement was also shown to be insignificant in regard to 
the development of goodwill. Therefore, it cannot be proved that the dependent variables are 
affected by the proxy Index of Enforcement in any case. This indicates that the grade of 
financial reporting enforcement does not affect the development of goodwill. 
The proxy Earnings Management has not been shown to be of any significant matter. 
According to Leuz (2010), principles-based standards give managers the opportunity to 
convey their expertise to the markets, but also give room for managers to pursue hidden 
reporting motives. As well, the findings by Ball et al. (2003) regarding smoothed earnings, 
disclose the incentives among managers that may affect the development of goodwill. Since 
the proxy Earnings Management is not significant, it may have an impact on the dependent 
variables, but it cannot be proved in this thesis. The proxy Earnings Management shows 
which protection the investors have from insiders’ incentives to manage the result of private 
control benefits. Due to the insignificance in the outcome, there is no evidence which 
indicates that managers’ incentives to influence the accounting of goodwill will have an effect 
on the development of goodwill. 
6.3 Further analysis 
The idea with mutual regulation that was implemented in 2005 in the EU was to achieve 
certain benefits. One of these benefits is to harmonize the comparability of the financial 
statements, which is not yet completed due to differences among countries that still exist. The 
outcome of following IFRS is not equal among countries within the EU (Pope & McLeay 
2011). The differences can for example depend on local enforcement, legal origin and/or 
management incentives. Hence, by examining enforcement, one of nine regressions proved 
that enforcement can explain the existing differences in the development of goodwill among 
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countries within the EU. In the outcome of the remaining eight tests, there is no significant 
evidence that enforcement can explain the development of goodwill. 
To ensure minimal effect from other factors, control variables such as traditions were used. 
When countries that do not originate from the same tradition adopt IFRS, and therefore the 
framework, it will lead to different outcomes (Brown 2011). Since all countries originates 
from various traditions, the regulations used in a country before implementing IFRS is of 
critical importance to how companies will present their financial reports, when following 
IFRS (Brown & Clinch 1998). Due to the importance of following the framework, 
enforcement is central. As of now, enforcement is held on a national level, making the 
European harmonization of financial reporting difficult to complete. In the proxies used for 
enforcement, there are different degrees, which indicate that the quality of enforcement 
among countries varies. Hence, the degree of compliance with IFRS indirect depends on the 
quality of enforcement (Pope & McLeay 2011). 
As to principles-based standards, the room for judgments provides opportunities for 
incentives. According to Leuz (2010), judgments can be misused by managers in order to 
present better financial statements; in comparison to the true economic situation. Due to the 
principles-based standards and a low quality of enforcement, incentives to manipulate 
financial reports arise (Daske et al. 2008). This is so because companies may not want to 
make impairments of goodwill and indirect signaling to the market that the company is doing 
badly. In the article written by Ball et al. (2003) there are findings concerning companies in 
East Asia, having strong incentives to manipulate and thus report smoothing earnings. In the 
same manner one can manipulate the result by smoothing earnings; one can also influence the 
financial outcome through impairments of goodwill.  
Due to the findings, enforcement can only explain the differences in the development of 
goodwill, in one of nine regressions. This implies that there can be other factors that the 
differences depend on, apart from the ones that we have tested and controlled for.  
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7. Conclusions 
In the seventh and final chapter, conclusions are stated and the research question is 
answered.  Also this chapter contains suggestions for further research. 
7.1 Enforcement 
The purpose of this thesis has been to find out if enforcement can explain the differences in 
the development of goodwill within the EU. This is made by testing three proxies of 
enforcement against Goodwill/Total Assets, Goodwill/Intangible Assets and Impairments of 
Goodwill. Even though all countries within the EU apply the same framework, there are still 
differences when managing goodwill. We have examined if enforcement is a factor to be 
reckoned with, considering differences in financial reporting.  
To begin with, by testing all countries within the EU during the time period 2005-2012, we 
found that enforcement both has and has not proved an impact on the development of 
goodwill.  
Previous research has stated that differences among countries remain after the implementation 
of IFRS. By identifying enforcement through our three chosen proxies and the control 
variables that could have an impact on the development of goodwill, we are able to draw a 
conclusion. One of the enforcement proxies, Corruption Perception Index, shows that 
enforcement affects the development of goodwill when it is tested with the dependent variable 
Goodwill/Total Assets. Further, the other regressions cannot prove that enforcement has an 
impact on the development of goodwill. 
Moreover, we have been able to confirm that there is a difference between the development of 
Goodwill/Total Assets and Goodwill/Intangible Assets. The intangible assets has increased 
more in relation to goodwill, than what total assets have, which is an interesting finding and 
will be suggested for further research. 
Our thesis is in accordance with the studies by Brown (2011), Pope and McLeay (2011) and 
Leuz (2010). However, their studies have mostly considered the adoption of IFRS, while our 
focus has been on the effects that enforcement has had.  
Finally, to be able to take part of the benefits gained by the harmonization mentioned by 
Brown (2011), a further harmonization of accounting practices is necessary. 
7.2 Suggestions for further research 
For further research, we suggest a similar study with a similar hypothesis and method used in 
this study but including other proxies of enforcement. This is so since our findings only 
resulted in one significant connection between enforcement and its impact on the 
development of goodwill. 
Our thesis considers enforcement on a country level, which opens up for two different 
directions.  Thus, one suggestion is a study that examines enforcement on a firm level: for 
example if the level of a strong corporate governance has an impact on the development of 
goodwill. Since enforcement is measured on a country level, the other suggestion is to 
examine the development of enforcement within a country, in order to exclude underlying 
country factors and capture the essence.  
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In this thesis we have found that intangible assets have increased more than total assets, in 
relation to goodwill. Therefore, it would be interesting to conduct a study that examines IFRS 
3 Business combinations, to reveal if it is the impact of the implementation of the standard 
that is the reason to the finding. 
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Appendix 
Variable information on a country level 
 
 
 
Countries Traditions 
Index of 
enforcement 
Earnings 
management 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Austria German 8 10 69 
Belgium French 22 8,5 75 
Bulgaria    41 
Croatia  5  48 
Cyprus    63 
Czech Republic  6,5  48 
Denmark Scandinavian 22 13,5 91 
Estonia    68 
Finland Scandinavian 12 20,5 89 
France French 17,5 8 71 
Germany German 20 7,25 78 
Greece French 9 6,5 40 
Hungary  10  54 
Ireland English 10 22,5 72 
Italy French 19 6,25 43 
Latvia    53 
Lithuania    57 
Luxembourg    80 
Malta    56 
Netherlands French 13,5 24,25 83 
Poland  7,5  60 
Portugal French 10,5 7,5 62 
Romania  7  43 
Slovakia    47 
Slovenia  8  57 
Spain French 12,5 11,25 59 
Sweden Scandinavian 7 24 89 
United Kingdom English 22 25,25 76 
 
 
